Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration
runc: Host runc binary overwritten from inside a container
Impact
Host runc binary overwritten from inside a container; full host root. The canonical container-escape
Who can reach it
Any tenant workload that can exec as root in its own container, or a malicious image
What to do
Replace the runc binary on every node; already-running containers keep the vulnerable fd, so a full drain and pod restart is required
Fleet impact
How widespread
Universal - the original runc escape; affected Docker, containerd and CRI-O simultaneously
Cost to remediate
node-drain - the host runc binary itself is overwritten by the exploit, so remediation is binary replacement plus recreation of every container; the standing mitigation is making runc immutable
Why it hits the whole fleet
A container process rewrites /proc/self/exe and overwrites the *host* runc binary, so every subsequent container start on that host executes attacker code as root - the canonical fleet-wide container-runtime emergency
References
This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.