GPU VulnDB

Database/Container, Kubernetes & orchestration

ingress-nginx: "IngressNightmare": unauthenticated RCE in the admission controller, reachable from any pod

CVE-2025-1974Container, Kubernetes & orchestrationcurated

Impact

"IngressNightmare": unauthenticated RCE in the admission controller, reachable from any pod, giving cluster-wide secret access and full cluster takeover

Who can reach it

Any pod on the cluster network, no credentials needed

What to do

Emergency controller upgrade, or delete the ValidatingWebhookConfiguration and network-restrict the admission port. Rolling controller upgrade, no GPU drain. The highest-priority item in this table for a multi-tenant neocloud

Fleet impact

How widespread

Very common - ingress-nginx is the default ingress on most managed and self-run K8s clusters, including the control planes neoclouds put in front of GPU tenants

Cost to remediate

daemon-restart (rolling deployment upgrade of the controller) - cheap on the ingress pods themselves, but the *cleanup* is the pain: every secret in every namespace must be assumed stolen and rotated

Why it hits the whole fleet

Anything on the pod network - i.e. any tenant workload - can hit the validating admission controller, load a shared library into the controller pod and read all secrets in all namespaces, which is cluster takeover

References

This entry is curated: imported from vendor advisories with machine assistance, not yet individually verified. Confirm against your vendor's advisory before acting, and report anything wrong.