Argo Workflows (controller, hostNetwork / securityContext / serviceAccountName merge path): The first fix for

Impact

The first fix for CVE-2026-31892 gated only on podSpecPatch, leaving hostNetwork, securityContext and serviceAccountName free to flow from the tenant's Workflow through the merge into the pod. Setting hostNetwork true puts a tenant pod on the node's network namespace, and overriding serviceAccountName lets it borrow a more privileged identity - both are direct escapes from the tenant's slice of a shared GPU node.

Who can reach it

Any user who can submit a Workflow that references a hardened template, on a controller running templateReferencing Strict or Secure.

What to do

Upgrade the controller to 3.7.14 or 4.0.5 and restart, then continue to 3.7.15 / 4.0.6 to also cover CVE-2026-54526. Enforce hostNetwork and serviceAccountName restrictions with Pod Security Admission and an admission policy rather than relying on the controller's allow-list.

References